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DANIEL J. NIXON, ] 
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vs. ] 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU ] 
CHIEF, DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION ] 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) Brief of Appellant 
) Case No. 930549-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Section 78-2a-3(b)(i) Utah Code Ann. confers jurisdiction on 
the Utah Court of Appeal to decide "appeals from the district court 
review of adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies[.]" 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether Plaintiff is irrevocably foreclosed from 6e novo 
review in the District Court of Driver License Division's 
Administrative action to suspend his driver license if he did not 
request a hearing before the driver license hearing officer. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because this case presents a strictly legal issue the trial 
court's statutory interpretation is accorded no deference on 
appeal, but is reviewed for correctness. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen. 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 489 U.S. 841 
(1990); State v. Singh. 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 41-6-44.10 Utah Code Ann., Section 53-3-224 Utah Code 
Ann., Section 63-46b-14 Utah Code Ann., Section 63-46b-15 Utah Code 
Ann., are determinative in this action. 
There are no constitutional provisions determinative in this 
action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an Appeal from an Order of the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County, State of Utah, dismissing the Plaintiff's petition for 
review of Administrative action to suspend Plaintiff's driver 
license. The Order appealed from was entered on or about the 3rd 
day of May, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Daniel J. Nixon was arrested on December 2, 1992 for Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of Section 41-6-44 
Utah Code Ann. At this time, Mr. Nixon was served with a notice 
regarding the intent of Driver License Services to take action with 
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regard to his driving privilege. (Exhibit A,) Mr. Nixon did not 
request a hearing pursuant to his opportunity to do so as outlined 
in Exhibit A. Instead, he relied on the warning near the bottom 
of Exhibit A which states "FAILURE TO REQUEST A HEARING OR FAILURE 
TO APPEAR FOR HEARING may result in loss of your driving 
privilege." Plaintiff further relied on Section 53-3-224 Utah Code 
Ann. (1989) which states (1) "A person denied a license or whose 
license has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the division 
may seek judicial review of the division's order" and on the fact 
that no statute or rule requires an individual to request a hearing 
or suffer the loss of his right to judicial review under the 
statute cited above nor under Section 63-46b-15 Utah Code Ann. 
(1989). 
When the Driver License Department suspended Mr. Nixon's 
driving privilege, he attempted to avail himself of his statutory 
opportunity for judicial review of the division's order. The 
District Court denied his petition stating the Plaintiff was not 
entitled to judicial review of the Driver License Division's Order 
because "an individual is not entitled to judicial review of the 
actions of administrative agencies unless and until the individual 
has exhausted all administrative remedies." The Court concluded 
it was without jurisdiction and dismissed Plaintiff's case with 
prejudice. 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plain language of the statutes governing driving 
privileges clearly indicates that any person who is denied a 
license or whose license has been suspended, cancelled or revoked 
by the Driver License Department may seek review by trial de novo 
in the district court. The district court erred when it denied 
review because the Defendant/Appellant did not participate in the 
optional Driver License Division hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant's participation at a Driver License Division hearing 
to determine if an individual's driving privilege may be suspended 
pursuant to allegations of driving under the influence is 
permissive, not mandatory. Because this is a case of first 
impression, Plaintiff relies on analogous decisions to support his 
argument. In Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce. 810 P.2d 459 (Utah 
App. 1991), this court examined whether department review was a 
mandatory prerequisite to judicial review of Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing (Division) action. This 
court said, "unlike statutory provisions governing the Public 
Service Commission which reaui re parties to apply for review or 
rehearing by the Public Service Commission before seeking judicial 
review, (see Section 54-7-15 (1990) Utah Code Ann.), the appeals 
procedure governing the Division is nothing more nor less than what 
is specified in Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA)[.]M This 
court went on to say that no provision in the statutes governing 
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the Division appeared to provide for review beyond the Division 
level as contemplated in Section 12(1 )(a) of UAPA, nor is any 
mandatory review provided for as contemplated in section 12(3). 
This court further commented that the usage of the words "permit" 
and "may" indicate review is optional. 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Affirmance relies 
on State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson. 782 P.2d 519 (Utah 1989) and 
S & G. Inc. v. Morgan. 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990) (a state engineer 
decision). In a later note to the court, Defendant cites the case 
of Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Comm'n. 221 Utah Advanced 
Reporter 17 (Utah Appellate 1993) filed September 7, 1993, as 
further support of their position that Mr. Nixon's participation 
in the DLS hearing was a mandatory prerequisite to cJe novo judicial 
review. Considering the differences between these Commissions, the 
State Engineer and the Driver License Division, it seems unlikely 
that the holdings in these cases have direct application to the 
Driver License Division. The policy issues which govern the Driver 
License Division (DLS) are more analogous to Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing than it is to the State Tax 
Commission or the State Industrial Commission. The purpose of DLS 
and the Division parallel in many ways: they both grant licenses 
to individuals who have a measurable amount of knowledge in a given 
area; with the license comes privileges and duties. Licensing 
serves to protect the public from harm resulting from action taken 
by an individual who lacks a minimal amount of knowledge and from 
harm resulting from action taken by an individual who acts contrary 
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to the duty he assumed when his privilege was granted. When DLS 
or the Division suspend or revoke an individual's license, the 
purpose is to punish the individual for acting in a manner contrary 
to the duty imposed by the agency and accepted by the individual 
upon licensing of that individual. 
The purpose of the State Tax Commission is to enforce the 
state tax laws. The purpose of the State Industrial Commission in 
the case of Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Comm'n, £d.is to 
enforce the Anti-Discrimination Act. The purpose of the State 
Engineer in S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, supra is to change the point of 
diversion of a water right. Because these Commissions have 
purposes substantially different from the purposes of the licensing 
agencies, these decisions are not directly applicable to the issue 
before the court in this case. This court should instead rely on 
Heinecke v. Dept of Commerce, supra to determine whether by statute 
the Plaintiff is irrevocably foreclosed from de novo review in the 
district court of Driver License Division's Administrative action 
to suspend his driver license since he did not request a hearing 
before the driver license hearing officer. 
The statutes governing Motor Vehicles provides "A person 
denied a license or whose license has been cancelled, suspended or 
revoked by the division may seek judicial review of the 
department's order." Section 53-3-224 Utah Code Ann. "The district 
courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final 
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings[. ]" 
Section 63-46b-15 Utah Code Ann. No statute requires Defendant to 
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request a hearing before DLS or suffer loss of right for de novo 
review under Section 53-3-224 or Section 63-46b-15 Utah Code Ann. 
The letter (Exhibit B) from the Department of Public Safety 
informing the defendant that his driving privilege was suspended 
pursuant to agency action also informs the defendant of his right 
to appeal the agency's action: "Unless you have failed to appear 
for the hearing, you may appeal this action in the District Court 
in the County of your residence within thirty days." The plain 
language of this letter denies an appeal only to those who have 
"failed to appear for the hearing." It makes no statement, 
warning, or admonition to the person who simply does not request 
a hearing in the first place. Thus, there is no obligation to the 
licensee to either request or attend a hearing to avail himself of 
the judicial review of the original and final agency action under 
Section 53-3-224 Utah Code Ann. 
Judicial review under Title 41 is a trial c[e novo in the 
district court. Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Ann. This provision 
when viewed with Section 63-46b-14 Utah Code Ann. which provides 
for judicial review except when a statute expressly prohibits 
review, compels the conclusion that it is not necessary to take any 
Administrative steps to protect the right of an action to reinstate 
a driving privilege suspended or revoked by the department, when 
that is a final order. Defendant submits that the procedure 
involved in taking the his driving privilege is an informal one 
under the Administrative Code. Both the Administrative Code and 
Sections 53-3-224 and 41-6-44.10 Utah Code Ann. authorize direct 
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appeal by way of Petition to the district court. 
The DLS held some form of determinative process in connection 
with the Plaintiff's driving privilege and ruled against him. The 
Plaintiff, relied on the plain language of the citation issued to 
him at the time of his arrest: "FAILURE TO REQUEST A HEARING OR 
FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR HEARING may result in loss of your driving 
privilege." (Exhibit A) and though choosing not to participate in 
the hearing, waited to see what action the agency would take. When 
the agency suspended his license, Plaintiff relied on the plain 
language of the suspension letter which stated: "Unless you have 
failed to appear for the hearing, you may appeal this action in the 
District Court in the County of your residence within thirty days." 
Based on the information given to the Plaintiff, a reasonable 
person would not conclude failure to request a hearing would 
prohibit review of a decision resulting from that hearing. If an 
individual were required to request a hearing, attend a hearing or 
be precluded from judicial review of the agency's decision to 
suspend his license, the word "shall" would be used in place of the 
word "may." 
In Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990), 
this court discussed the protection against prejudice afforded to 
a licensee at the informal DLS hearings because of the licensee's 
"absolute right to a trial de novo before the district court." In 
Brinkerhoff, this court held that the "trial de novo in the 
district court provided by the UAPA eliminated any prejudice to the 
defendant [by error in the proceedings below.]" The Defendant's 
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Memorandum in Support of Summary Affirmance supports this 
conclusion by stating, "[r]eview of the administrative suspension 
of his driving privileges is governed by the UAPA". Section 63-46b-
1, et sea. Utah Code Ann. Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to 
a trial de novo in the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
The argument of the Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies is misplaced according to the 
governing statutes and case law of this matter. Therefore, 
Plaintiff is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court and 
this Court should reverse and remand this matter for hearing. 
DATED this H* day ofOClA' 
*ANKLIN A 
Attorney for 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
at p. true and correct eopy of the THIS IS TO CERTIFY tha
foregoing Brief of Appellant, Daniel Nixon, was hand-delivered or 
mailed postage prepaid, this 4 
/ day of January 1994, to: 
JAN GRAHAM, #1231 
Attorney General 
THOM ROBERTS #2773 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
236 State Capitol 
A D D E N D U M 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL J. NIXON, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 930400059 
vs. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Bureau Chief, 
Defendant. 
The Court has received plaintiff's opposing memorandum and request for oral 
argument on defendant's Motion to Dismiss. However, the memorandum and request are 
untimely under Rule 4-501 C.J.A. in that they were filed more than 10 days after the filing 
of defendant's motion. Hence, the Court will not grant oral argument in this case. 
However, for purposes of making its ruling on the motion, the Court has fully considered 
plaintiff's opposing memorandum, in addition to defendant's memorandum and supporting 
affidavit. After such consideration, the Court finds plaintiffs defense to the motion, and the 
plaintiffs action itself, to be frivolous. 
Plaintiff admits that he did not request a hearing, even though he received notice on 
the citation itself that he was entitled to a hearing concerning the revocation of his driver's 
license before the Drivers License Division. The hearing offered by the division clearly 
constitutes an administrative remedy. It is well settled law that as a general rule an 
individual is not entitled to judicial review of the actions of administrative agencies unless 
and until the individual has exhausted all administrative remedies. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-14 (1989). See also State Tax Commission v. Iverson. 782 P. 2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989). 
Plaintiff has failed to allege or establish in this case any valid exception to the general rule 
noted above. 
Because plaintiff failed to avail himself of the hearing offered to him by the Driver's 
License Division, the Court must conclude that he has not exhausted all administrative 
remedies as is required before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, this case 
is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an order of dismissal within 15 days of this 
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum 
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 21st day of April, 1993. 
cc: J. Franklin Allred, Esq. 
Thorn D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
THOM ROBERTS (2773) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL J. NIXON, * 
* ORDER OF DISMISSAL BASED UPON 
Plaintiff, * FAILURE TO EXHAUST 
* ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
vs. * 
* 
G. BARTON RLACKSTOCK, Bureau * Civil No. 930400059 
Chief, * 
* Judge Harding 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter having been submitted to the 
Court on Defendant's Motion for Dismissal for Failure to Exhaust 
Administrative Remedies, and the Court having reviewed the Motion 
to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, the 
affidavits filed in support thereof, and the Memorandum filed in 
support thereof, and the Court having reviewed the Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Exhaust Administrative Remedies and the documents filed by 
counsel for the Plaintiff, and the Court being fully advised in 
the premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's 
Complaint shall be and is hereby dismissed and the Plaintiff 
shall recover nothing thereby, based upon the Plaintiff's failure 
to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
DATED this day of May,1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
RAY M. HARDING 
District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL BASED UPON 
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES to the following this 
L5'C day of May, 19 93: 
J. Franklin Allred 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 -— - y 
* >C Mftu s M4y<> W 
2 
,MONS AND CM A HUN 
STATE OF UTAH —Li.
 ICY 
NAW6 
OF - ^ V A X i&LL 
"Wrrs MJlXJ?j± 
Y > ^v>> i > 
., Miopie) DOB # _ 
1/^V^-T-- ^ ^ 7 ^ " / / _ . ^g^e. „T'._ ffi/g^*-
I >V»K ucen»« wo C m £.tsir»j |Slate fAiiinrtion Soc«i Society ' 
DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
N NOTICE TO APPEAR IN: 
jL^LCuk. 
j g / ^ ^ 3 /D iltt/&:L>T / ? ?33 VO-IOCSI i =*- = * 
MotCWl* 
r aa._Ai...d^fei_ 
H$<gnf .Wofgnf ;6yes ;S«x (Venice L'cense No, {State
 y Exptraj 
, Ve '^C9>Maxe i Venice "ype IY** / Oo»or |Acc»cent Comm. Venicie 'Haj. Matenai | Direction of rravil 
i (5) nor ^ Q'9 t*an (U) oays afler issuance 
™-E ABOVE NAMED OEPENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VICLAT'NG. 
'.: UTAH CODE '- COUNTY CCDE ¥ CITY COOE NO C ^ l ^ J l ^ ^ L . 
^ — ^ ./: ^?^ /&^s~ . OAV OP ON rH£ c i / Z 
LOCATION 
V'CLA^ONfS' 
MILITARY TIME ./ 
MILS POST NO 
IZUZLL 
FOR C C U * ? JSE CNLY 
wONViCTtON 
SUSPENCED 
SUSPENCED 
O N 
M'ty C No Con'•?'.,? 
n'ty T No' Gu< 'v 
ge 
l Q£p"-irv ^ H A T A C C p v OF THiS SUMMONS AND CTATiCN WAS 0 U l v SERVED UPON THE QEFENOANT 
ACCCPC'NG ' 0 'wA.V ON ""HE ABOVE QATC
 A N Q I K N O W OR BEL'EVE AND SC ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE 
NAME'; DEp5NDAN r C'C COMMIT ryg OFFENSE wEoe'N SE" FORTH CQNTRARv ^0 UAW I FURTHER CER-
TIPv ' n A T "w«£ X ' . , p r " 0 W H I C H THE OEPENDANT WA$ BEEN DIRECTED r C AP&E.AR IS THE PROPER 
COU'Pr PURS. AN" "0 ?ECT'CN -7.7.19 U C A 
g Agency 
. OA;:GE NO 5*Z.2L. 
DATE CJ CITATION 
7: 
/iz. 
CCUPT COPY ON! 
lOATE SENT * 0 Ol? i DOCKET NO 
r 
RSAP CAREFULLY" 
citation is not an ;nformation and will not be usea as an information without your consent. !f an information s t!iea you wrir *e prcviced 3 cooy 
»e court. Vou MUST appear \r\ court on or oe'ore the time set *« t^s citation »P YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN INFORMATION W'LL BE FiLSD AND THE 
•RT MAY 'SSUE A WARRANT FOR Y O U R APPSST N O T I C E OF INTENT T O DENY, S U S P E N D , OR R E V O K E : 
" ICER, C H E C K A P P R O P R I A T E BOX 
(AflRJIST UNDER 41-S-44 UCA) 
You are hereoy notified that tmay (30) days 'rcnn tre cate o< t^ 'S notice your ^nvmg privilege «n the State ?' U^ an will be suspended 
pursuant to 41.2-130 'JCA for nmery (90) Cays for a first o^ense or 'or one (1) /ea/ for a second or subsequent o^ense. or revoked for one 
0) year pursuant to 41-6-44.10 UCA for refusal to suc^'t to a cnenmcaj tert. 
(ARREST UNCER 3ZV12-209) 
JL/VENIt£ ','jf*CQf 2* yrn) You are **'eoy *QI<' ec: t'»a; *.h^vf c^e <3i) oays feom the date of" th<s not/ce yO'*' d' vmg ?>,-' ?ge in the S!3?e or* 
Utan w'l be <tenxxj pjrsuant to 41.$~*4 4 -JQA 'or n^ r^T- y} cn'3 'or a 'r^t offense, ex suap«nde<j for one M) yea' *c a seco^o or 
suoseQuer.t of^ e^ se -n three (3) yea's, or susoenoeo *cr o^e ^J year or until age seventeen (17) whichever is 'crc;e' »f you have not ^oten 
issued an ongtnai operator license, or revoked 'or one M) >ear 'or re^usa: to submit to a cnem-cai test pursuant <o 41-6-u 10. 
COMP'^ ETION OF AUTHORIZED SUBSTANCE ABUSE PRCORAM REQUIRED FOR RON STATEMENT. 
RIGHT TO HEARJNG "he Oivision w H grant you cooolun,^ r0r a *e3"ng but only if you subm.t a WRrTTEN REQUEST wi^in TEN (10) DAYS of your 
3'restto: T've' Lrce^ct Z vs«on at 45C^ South 2^0 v\est ^ C v:* :;!360, SaK La^e C-ty. Utah 8-S130-C560 (ATTN. D U : Sect on). Upon your timely 
request yc* A«:I se -;*t' ed of the t'^e and 3.ace c' the ^e:r ^g "^o nea'mg % r*n 'or purpose of granting a ' ntteo ce^se but only to determine 
•' your pr.vng ofiv.Jece .$ to be denteo. su«5cenced c 'ev^^oc: rv,e ac^'n.$:'atve hearing 13 cv»i in nature a*o ooes rot sat<sfy the requirement 
'cr you to .^ ocear m run when rtQvi'tc. FAILURE TO ^ CUEST A HEARJNG OR FAJLURE TO APPEAR FOR A HEARING may result m less 0' your 
3r»v<ng pr'v»lege. 
''COMMERCIAL ORMER UCENSE HOUXVRS SEE REVERSE SIDE 
;s VAUD / \ NOT VAL'D D as a le^cc 
•RATCR G CCMMCRC'/l C CLASS 
ary 1 ce^se •c JO to !h,fTy !3C'N days f» 5m the aate o* »h'5 not;ce. 
EMXDRSEMENTS 
^ 
r : • • • . , 
D Douglas Uod'nro 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 
(', l l v . - v I'-;.. :.-.• •• i. !••;•.•• i i - i . „ . f 
""'DEC 2 7 1992 
D*i>»{v Commissi: 
4b0' $0U'»' ?700 W«s' ''(J ' ™. 
PO Bo* 30060 
0- aiU Johnson 1 S'1" u v « C"Y- u ' * h 8*' M-0560 
( 8 0 1 ) 9 6 5 ^ 4 3 / 
DANIEL f NIXON 
16 5 EAST CENTER 
PLEASANT GROVE UT 8 4 0G2 
DATE OF ARREST: 02 DEC 1992 
DATE OF BIRTH: 2<\ MAR ! V*'S 
LICENSE/FILE NUMBER: 819^683 
DATE: 25 DEC 1992 
THIS ORDER IS EFFECTIVE 
12:01 AM ON 31 DEC 1992 
fp Yt<J Cfic^i 6*yQ€&fsf-l 
AS A RESULT OF A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT ARREST FOR DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE, YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE IS SUSPENDED FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR 
EFFECTIVE 31 DEC 1992. 
/ 
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A HEARING, OR YOU HAVE SET OR RESET THE HEARING AFTER THE 30TH DAY FROM THE 
DATE OF THE ARREST OR YOU HAVE FAILED TO APPEAR FOR THE HEARING CONTRARY TO 
IJCA 41-6-44, l/CA -11-2-130 AND UCA 63-46b-3 AND 63-46b-ll). 
CREDIT WILL BE GIVEN FOR ANY TIME YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE; HAS ALREADY HE EN 
WITHDRAWN AS A RESULT OF YOUR CONVICTION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE OF DR: VN'l 
UNDLR THE INFLUENCE. 
THIS ACTION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF TITLE 41, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1"> rv3 . THIS NOTICE DOES NOT REPLACE ANY PRIOR NOTICE 
ALREADY IN EFFECT. • 
***IMPORTANT INFORMATION - PLEASE READ*** 
WHEN YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE HAS SEEN SUSPENDED YOU MUST DISCONTINUE DRIVING 
AND DELIVER YOUR LICENSE TO THIS DEPARTMENT. YOU MAY NOT OPERATE A MOTOR 
VEHICLE UNTIL YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN REINSTATED. IT IS A 
MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPCN THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE 
WHILE YOUR DRIVING "RIVILIT-E IS SUSPENDED. 
F YOU HAVE NOT VOLUN'.\R ! LY SURRENDERED ALL LICENSES AND PERMITS WITHIN 
i TWENTY (20) DAYS AND A PICKUP ORDER IS ISSUED FOR THESE ITEMS, AN 
^{ ADDITIONAL S25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED AT THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT. 
j \ ^ \ UNLESS YOU FAILED TO APPEAR FOR THE HEARING, YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN 
' ^ ^ THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE COUNTY OF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS. 
^ TO REINSTATE YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE: 
>Ao^ ' !F THIS IS YOUR SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT ALCOHOL OFFENSE, YOU MUST PROVIDE 
'* W PROOF OF COMPLETION OF A STATE APPROVED ALCOHOL REHABILITATION COURSE, 
c
 x V* PAY A S75.00 REINSTATEMENT FEE. MAKE A CHECK OR MONEY ORDER PAYABLE TO: 
5 ''iL^TAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY. PLEASE INDICATE YOUR DIVER LICENSE 
. QY* NUMBER ON THE CHECK A\'D MAIL TO "HE ALOVE ADDRESS. 
f *f$G9B/^ DLPEGGYJ 
r 
0, BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU CHIEF 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 
MOTOR VEHICLES 41-6-44.10 
lid before the person's driving privilege 
Aitated, to cover administrative costs. This 
All be canceled if the person obtains an un-
tied Driver License Division hearing or 
.decision that the suspension was not 
A'person whose operator license has been 
t suspended, or postponed by the Driver 
M Division under this section may file a 
on within 30 days after the suspension for a 
agon the matter which, if held, is governed 
rtion 63-3-224. 
ir reinstatement of an operator license for a 
M under this section, a report authorized 
ftion 63*3*104 may not contain evidence of 
1 or suspension of the person's operator li-
ler this section if he has not been convicted 
wr offense for which the denial or suspen-
be extended. 
e provisions of Sections 41-12a*411 and 
2 do not apply to a denial or suspension 
br a first offense under this section if the 
suspension is based solely on a violation of 
B (2Xa). 
In addition to the penalties in Subsection 
person who violates Subsection (2)(a) shall 
ferred by the Driver License Division to the 
substance abuse authority for an assess-
e d recommendation for appropriate ac-
(i) Reinstatement of the person's operator 
icense or the right to obtain an operator li* 
ense is contingent upon successful comple-
jon of the action recommended by the local 
tubstance abuse authority. 
(li) The local substance abuse authority's 
tcommended action shall be determined by 
in assessment of the person's alcohol abuse 
rod may include: 
% (A) a targeted education and proven-
* tion program; 
(B) an early intervention program; or 
(C) a substance abuse treatment pro* 
gram. 
r(iii) Successful completion of the recom-
mended action shall be determined by stan-' 
lards established by the Division of Sub-
stance Abuse. 
At the conclusion of the penalty period im- * 
d under Subsection (2), the local substance 
e authority shall notify the Driver License 
lion of the person's status regarding comple-
of the recommended action. 
) The local substance abuse authorities shall' 
jku) 
% r 
(B) The costs and fees under 8ubsee** 
tion (A) shall be based on a sliding scale 
consistent with the local substance 
abuse authority's policies and practices 
regarding fees for services. less 
41-6*44*5. Admissibility of chemical test results 
in actions for driving under the influ-
ence — WeigLt of evidence. 
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding 
in *hich it is material to prove that a person was 
operating or in actual physics! control of a vehi-
cle while undar il.e influence of alcohol or drugs 
or with a blood cr breath alec hoi content statu-
torily prohibited, the results cf a chemical test or 
tests as authorized in Ezctici ^1-^1.10 aro ai-
uissiblo as evid.r.c:. 
(b) In a crimir^l
 b j-oce: 1'. j , noncompliance 
with Section 41-6-^.10 doeo not render the re-
sults of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of 
a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or 
drug content is admissible except when prohib-
ited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two 
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical con-
trol, the test result is admissible as evidence of the 
person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of 
the alleged operating or actual physical control, but 
the trier of fact shall determine what weight is given) 
to the result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from re-
ceiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defen-
dant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at 
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical 
control. isss 
41-6-44A Municipal attorneys for specified of-
fenses may prosecute for certain DUI 
offenses and driving while license sus-
pended or revoked. 
The following class A misdemeanors may be prose-
cuted by attorneys of cities and towns, as well as by 
prosecutors authonzed elsewhere in this code to pros* 
,cci:t3 theee alleged violations: 
. (1) alleged closa A misdemeanor \ bl.t i jns of 
Subsection 41-5-1 l(6XeXii); and 
(2) alleged violations of Section 63*3-227, 
which consist cf-the> person operating & vehicle 
while his operator's license is suspended or re-
voked for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a local 
ordinance which complies with the requirements 
of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 
76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the per-
son was charged with violating as a result of a 
plea bargain after having been originally 
erate wiifc the Driver License Division, im(.r^;'charged with violating one or more cf those sec-
(i) conducting the assessments; . r a t i o n s or ordinances^ . 
K
 (ii) making appropriate recommendations *• "W ™^' •yw no'^nwUu isss 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to cheniical tests for* 
alcohol or drug — Number of tests — 
Refusal —• Warning, report — Hearing, 
revocation of license — Appeal — Per-
son incapable of refusal — Results of 
test available — Who may give test — 
Evidence. '**«, * ** * 
tot action; and <n 
' (iii) notifying the tMver License Division 1 
about the person's status regarding comple- i *^I(1 ° 
tion of the recommended action. 
> (i) The local substance abuse authority is ' •'•'1 [> • < 
responsible for: - \« M r t o wt 
w»% (A) the coetW the'assessment^ the tftfqf b*ft* 
KM0erson's alcohol abuse; and < "< ^#» J M ) ti)(}A person operating %'ttotot vehicle in this 
mm* (B) for making a referral to Wappfo**Hp fc, stats is considered to have given his consent to 4 
fef^priate program on the basis of the findtf^o 'chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, of 
lvwn. ings of the assessment ^fcw urine for the purpose of determining whether he 
h (ii) (A) The person who violated 8ubsec-** tiofc'was operating or in actual physical control of a 
tov tion (2)(a) is responsible for all costs and ' f* () motor vehicle while having a blood or breath al-
ftV fees associated with the recommended '• n v\ cohol content statutorily prohibited under Sec-
fy^ program to which the person is referred. • tion 41*6-41 cr tl-Z-liA> or while under the in-
fluence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, if 
the test is or tests are administered at the direc-
tion of a peace officer having grounds to believe 
that person to have been operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
a blood or" breath alcohol content statutorily pro-
hibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or 
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Sec-
tion 41-6-44. " 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of 
the tests are administered and bpw many of 
^ e m a w a o M n i s t e n K l ^ ^ ^ " f ^ ' 
^ (ii) If an officer requests more than one 
lest, refusal by a person to take one or more 
requested tests, even though he does submit 
to any other requested test or tests, is a re-
fusal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under 
this section to submit to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath, bjood, or urine, may not 
select the test or tests to be administered. 
p
 y (ii) The failure or inability of a peace offi-
cer to arrange for any specific chemical test 
is not a defense to taking a test requested by 
a peace officer, and it is not a defence in any 
criminal, civil, cr edrr.i *btrative proceeding 
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to 
the requested test or t38ts. 
(£) (a) If the person has boon placed under arrest, 
ihas then been requested by a paace officer to sub-
; mty to any one or more of the chemical tests un-
der Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any 
chemical test requested, the person shall be 
warned by the peace officer requesting the test or 
tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests 
can result in revocation of the person's license to 
operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection 
(a), if the person does not immediately request 
ithat the chemical test or tests as offered by a 
peace officer be administered a peace officer shall 
serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver Li-
cense Division, immediate notice of the Driver 
License Division's intention to revoke the per-
son's privilege or license to operate a motor vehi-
cle. When the officer serves the immediate notice 
on behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or per-
mit, if any, of the operator; 
1
' (ii) issue a temporary license effective for 
only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form ap-
proved by the Driver License Division, basic 
information regarding how to obtain a hear-
ing before the Drive.*, licenzo Division. 
(c) A c'tation issued by a peace officer may, if 
approved as to form by t ie Driver License Divi-
ision, serve also as the temporary license. 
\\ <d) The peace officer shall submit a signed re-
port, within five days after the date cf the arrest, 
that he had grounds to believe the arrested per-
son had been operating or was in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited un-
der Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4 or while under 
the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination 
of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 
and that the person had refused to submit to a 
jchemicai test or tests under Subsection (1). 
t
 }A\\ (e) (i) A person who has been notified oft 
br'i (j
 (^k Driver License Division's intention to rev 
-ju< iwtt his license underthissectipn is entitled I 
to .»^£^aring. , r * '.JJ,] -»evhCi W ^ f l j S j 
^t^aaw (ii) A request for ^ e . hearingVihaO 
~\ l ^ ' m a d e in writii* ^ 
n TOdate of the arrest. ^ n ^ t A W W | 
'-./cjKjfV (iii) Upon written request, W d W o i 
; , ,'fl w shall grant to the person an opportunity jC 
>'/V.o.< be heard within 29 days after the ' d m * 
^ . ^ ^ a r r e s t < • W ^ | 
*7(- 'l '<' tty) If **** Person does not make a timely 
& SitPtfi written request for a hearing before the divi-
^ W 1 ^ W 8 Privilege to operate a motor vehicle, 
> ttJa#j;(in the state is revoked beginning on the 80tb. 
ii "^V'day after the date of arrest for a period < 
1
 (A) one year unleaf8ub#ection(By|frj 
plies; or ' ~ * ~ ^ j $ | 
(B) 18 months if the person has hs^| 
previous license sanction after July 1,'j 
1993, under this section, Section] 
41-2-130 or 41-6-44.4, or a conviction af-j 
ter July 1,1993, under Section 41*6Mij 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the personal 
xto.j conducted by the Driver License Division/ thfj 
'";' hearing shall be documented an4 shall cover tf 
'"' issues of: ~ '« ' ^ *| ,« 
d.wb < (j) whether a peace officer had reasonable! 
-ja j,n;i grounds to believe that a person was opertt-J 
. im> ing a motor vehicle in violation off 
?$<fA 41^44; and < ' ^ 
*", ^ W (ii) whether the person refused to i 
C^WVto the test. ' * -VH 
m
°
l
 ^ig) (i) In connection with the hearjng, the< 
vJI < 
| ; vision or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and i 
sue subpoenas for the attendance off 
nesses and the production of relev 
books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for tbel 
tendance of necessary peace officer*,! 
-oia tabu Q® "*• ^vision * a U P«y witness fees I 
y 4 *r8\ mileage from the Transportation Fund itii 
cordance with the rates established in 
•ii < 
-ttamq far 
•io iMmw nfei 
• f f i»J«» tion 21-5-4. m ^ijr (h) If after a hearing, the Driver Llcensel 
v sion determines that the person was requested { 
m submit to a chemical test or tests and refined | 
CM*U) submjtjo the test or tests, or if the person fUiij 
(W ': appear before the Driver License Division si f 
^\x quired in the notice, the Driver License Diy 
r
 shall revoke his license or permit to opers^  
\[n motor vehicle in Utah beginning on t£ej 
n, Rearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) one year unless Subsectio 
plies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person hall 
previous license sanction after Jul 
. 1993, under this section, 8« 
t 41-2-130 or 41-6-44.4, or a conviction^  
ter July 1,1993, under Section 41-6-
(ii) The Driver License Division shall j 
against the person, in addition t 
fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-2 ~ 
-oiitcjM i fee under Section 53-3-105, which I 
•bmVjAi* P**d before the person's driving priv 
"'' reinstated, to cover administrative < 
-^WV.::\' ( i i i ) T h e f e € 8ha11 ** excelled if t 
hm<\*$?c\ eon obtains an unappealed court < 
tebuftw lowing a proceeding allowed under t 
Jtermt'y section that the revocation was im 
r-alqmtn ^ » 
al v^rji/J* 
itdl f<< 
MOTOR VEHICLES 41-6-44.30 
^ H 0 f ( 0 Any person whose license has been re-
^HPVoked by the Driver License Division under 
^Hftfthi* section may seek judicial review. 
^ B r ' (ii) Judicial review of an informal ac-judi-
^WJ*cative proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the 
^ • 1 ^ district court in the county in which the per* 
HHw'son resides. 
HMfAfiy person who is dead, unconscious, or in any 
H r condition rendering him incapable of refusal to 
Halt to any chemical test or tests is considered to 
Kolfo withdrawn the consent provided for in Sub-
HMB (1), and the test or tests may be administered 
Htthet the person has been arrested or not. 
M) Upon the request of the person who was tested, 
prwulU of the test or tests shall be made available 
film. 
ItS) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practi-
Veal nurse, or person authorized under Section 
R 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, 
Wttay withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or 
P'drug content. This limitation does not apply to 
•'faking a urine or breath specimen. 
KM (b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical 
PVurae, or person authorized under Section 
w 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, 
fc draws a sample of blood from any person whom a 
tttoace officer has reason to believe is driving in 
•^ violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
Ifftcility at which the sample is drawn, is immune 
Plrom any civil or criminal liability arising from 
r drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
^according to standard medical practice. 
H6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own ex-
I pens*, have a physician of his own choice admin-
s' iater a chemical test in addition to the test or 
h teats administered at the direction of a peace offi-
l * f * > 
W (b) The failure or inability to obtain the addi-
tional test does not affect admissibility of the re-
faults of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
Ppeace officer, or preclude or delay theteet or testa 
jp to be taken at the direction of a peace officer. 
\& (C) The additional test shall be subsequent to 
^the teat or tests administered at the direction of a 
peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to sub-
t to a chemical test or tests, the person to be tested 
% not have the right to consult an attorney or have 
iattorney, physician, or other person present as a' 
jodition for the taking of any test. ' ,' \ *cr 
Jj8j) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a 
* mical test or tests or any additional test under 
i section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
iy civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out 
facta alleged to have been committed while the per-
il1 was operating or in actual physical control of a 
frwor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 
njrog, pr combination of alcohol and any drug. 
1*44411* 
UH 
;»ty j ai/Tf Jo Jnom lU wm^iw^ . ., t , .^. 
Repealed* fo oJ w ' imU'jAbJiifoq1' itai 
. Drinking alcoholic beverage and 
^
 t open containers in motor vehicle pro-5
 i' hibited — Definitions — Exceptions* 
person may not drink any alcoholic beverage 
fiOperating a motor vehicle or while a passenger 
motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, 
parked]on any highway.,, npdi* iU 
lA person may not keep, carry, possess^ trans-
sor allow another to keep, carry, possess, or 
rt in the passenger compartment of a motor 
e, when the vehicle is on any highway, any con-
tainer which contains any alcoholic beverage if the 
container has been opened, its seal broken, or the 
contents of the container partially consumed. 
(3) In this section: 
h (a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the meaning 
? f given in Section 32A-1-105. 
(b) "Chartered bus" has the meaning given in 
,,v8ection 32A-1-105. 
', (c) "Limousine" has the meaning given in Sec-
r
 \ tion 32A-1-105. 
nm ^ "Passenger compartment" means the area 
''| of the vehicle normally occupied by the operator 
'
 hm
 and passengers and includes areas accessible to 
"
n
 them while traveling, such as a utility or glove 
' compartment, but does not include a separate 
front or rear trunk compartment or other area of 
the vehicle not accessible to the operator or pas-
"' ' sengers while inside the vehicle. 
;'(4) Subsections (I) and (2) do not apply to passen-
1
 gers in the living quarters of a motor home or 
camper. 
V, (5) Subsection (2) does not apply to passengers 
traveling in any licensed taxicab or bus. 
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passen-
gers who have carried their own alcoholic beverage 
pnto a limousine or chartered bus that is in compli-
ance with Subsections 32A-12-213(l)(b) and (c). isso 
^41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehi-
cles by peace officers — Impound re* 
^l^tjl quiremente — Removal of vehicle by 
ii iM^ * owner. 
uA
 X\Y(&) If a peace officer arrests or cites the opera-
K<
 tor of a vehicle for violating Section 41-6-44 or 
^-•'
(
- 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section 
J [) 41-6-44 which complies with Subsection 41-6-
Vfcp 43(1), the officer shall seize and impound the ve-
<#hKhicle, except as provided under Subsection (2). 
*b t ,J (b) A vehicle seized and impounded under this 
Wrfp section shall be moved by a peace officer or by a 
<*~stfftow truck that meets the standards established: 
un,y 
nbMs 
(i) by the department under Subsection 
41-6-102(4)(b); 
(ii) under Title 41, Chapter 6, Article 18, 
Tow Truck and Impound Regulation Act; 
and 
(iii) the Public Service Commission under 
*ch AV 8ection 54-6-42.5. 
f. (2K If a registered owner of the vehicle1, other than 
4
 the operator, is present at the time of arrest, the offi-
1
 cer may release the vehicle to that registered owner, 
^but only if the registered owner 
(a) requests to remove the vekhle from tha 
"
vt
 'scene; 
1
 \ (b) presents to the officer a valid operator's li-
"'
i[
 ^ cense and sufficient identification to prove own-
x\\ ^ership of the vehicle; 
^1< (c) complies with all restrictions of) his opera-
P ! ^ W s license; and ' < * ^ 
pal* n
 ( d ) w o u l d not> i n the judgment of the officer, be..' 
hkh^in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10, or a 
/^ lJ local ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44 which 
*'
 v
 complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), if permitted 
to operate the vehicle, and if the vehicle itself is 
Y*p legally operable. 
«>^3) (a) The peace officer or agency by whom the 
?£% 7 officer is employed shall, within 24 hours after 
HO&pjthe seizure, notify the Motor Vehicle Division of A 
VWjWthc .seizure and impoundment.«, i>0\3i&crf4Hi ^ 
^ 4 , V ,Cb) Th« ao^ce shall state: ,IOT<« *j vtfsfiewtl'* 
*m \WA 1y (i) the operator's name;'»,r\f A V WWf 
jlnf vr ' (ii) a description of the vehicle; * v <»»1 
PUBLKfSXfrfifY &&2& 
••moving from the highways those persons 
i shown they are safety hazards. lses 
Chemical test for driving under the in* 
fluence — Temporary license — Hear* 
v ing and decision — Suspension and fee 
- — Judicial review. 
If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
ve that a person may be violating or has 
tod Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the opera-
of a vehicle with a certain blood or breath 
ioi concentration and driving under the in-
ce of any drug, alcohol, or combination of a 
and alcohol, the peace officer may, in con-
on with arresting the person, request that 
erson submit to a chemical test or tests to be 
nistered in compliance with the standards 
r Section 41-6-44.10. 
In this section, a reference to Section 
44 includes any similar focal ordinance 
ted in compliance with Subsection 
43(1).
 f 
• peace officer shall advise a person prior to 
EI'S submission to a chemical test that a test 
licating a violation of Section 41-6-44 shall, 
ristence of a blood alcohol content sufficient 
the person incapable of safely driving a mo-
e may, result in suspension or revocation of 
n's license to drive a motor vehicle. 
ie person submits to a chemical test and the 
ts indicate a blood or breath alcohol content 
m of Section 41-6-44, or if the officer makes 
nation, based on reasonable grounds, that 
m is otherwise in violation of Section 
he officer directing administration of the 
iking the determination shall serve on the 
i behalf of the division, immediate notice of 
on's intention to suspend the person's l u -
Irive a motor vehicle. < 
When the officer serves immediate notice 
half of the division he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or per? 
lit, if any, of the driver, > > ) ^ 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate 
ffective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the driver, on a form to be 
pproved by the division, basic information 
Bgarding how to obtain a prompt hearing 
efore the division. 
A citation issued by the officer may, if ap-
i as to form by the division, serve also as 
imporary license certificate, 
peace officer serving the notice shall send 
ision within five days after the date of ar-
lervice of the notice:
 4 (.o t s> 
the person's license certificate; ' ,y" >''® 
a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
a signed report on a form approved by the 
on indicating the chemical test results, it 
any other basis for tne officers detennin*:* "• 
bat the person has violated Section 41-6-44. V 
Upon written request, the division shall 
to the person an opportunity to be heard 
129 days after the date of arrest. The re-
Jo be heard shall be made within ten days 
i date of the arrest. ,
 } , , , ' 
A hearing, if held, shall be before the divi-
a the county in which the arrest occurred,' 
i the division and the person agree that the 
ig may be held in some other county, ^a 
10 .1 / 
'«/a^;"
 1 
» b ' ' ^ 
fcaaV /j> 
b«h' . 
it 
sndfa<l'>" 
,V«7. 
MfftM! 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall 
cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe the person was driving a 
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit 
to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the divi-
sion or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may is-
sue subpoenas for the attendance of wit-
nesses and the production of relevant 
books and papers; 
(B) may issue subpoenas for the at-
tendance of necessary peace officers. 
an rr * *li) T h e d*^**011 8n*H P*y witness fees and 
sbtfth r nwteag* fr°m the Transportation Fund in ac-
{l i cordance with the rates established in Sec-
tion 2-15-4. 
oi M (e) One or more memleis cf the division may 
l>t)ls conduct the hearing. 
^ , (f) Any decision made after a hearing before 
.8j>f any number of the members of the division is as 
TO ^ valid as if made after a hairing lafore the full 
Q(U\ membership of the division. ,< 0 
n (g) After the hearing, the division shall order 
rmtr whether the person's license to drive a motor ve-
" 0 hide is suspended or not. 
M«* ' (h) If the person for whom the hearing is held 
ofttf fails to appear before the division as required in 
Us^'the notice, the diviaion shall order whether the 
— 0 s person's license to drive a motor vehicle is sus-
hsici pended or not. 
^ ( 7 ) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or1 hot 
^ ' challenged under this subsection, is for a period 
<lfr of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the 
'
ro
*' date of the arrest. 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under 
, n
°' this subsection is for a period of one year, begin-
10
 ning on the 30th day after the date of arrest. }
' (8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, 
:>' , in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 
^
K63-3-206(14) for driving under the influence, a 
" .. fee under Section 53-3-106 to cover administra-
1
 tive costs, which shall be paid before the person's 
^ , driving privilege is reinstated. This fee shall be 
cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed di-
fy,, vision hearing or court decision that the suspen-jn^fsion was not proper. 
n i |v, (b) A pen:., v.hece license has been suspended 
^ by the divicion under this subsection may file^ 
j , , , , petition within 30 days after the suspension for, % 
1 ^ Rearing on the matter which, if held, is governed 
fl0,>by Section 63-3-224. 
68-8-224. 
1
 di, 1h 
be-ff'Jpoi 
Filing a petition for hearing — Judi-
cial review of license cancellation, re-
vocation, or suspension — Scope of re-, 
person denied a license or whose license ha#> 
been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the division 1 
may seek judicial review of the division's o r d e r s 
j(2) (a) Venue for judicial review of informal a4ju-
&$**• dicative proceedings is in the district court in the 
»<tu county where the person resides. 
io •» > (b) Persons not residing in the state shall filei 
&h'in Salt Lake County or the county where the of-
> eftjfense occurred, which resulted in the cancella-* 
.boition, suspension, or revocation. «*A* iJ H i^esi* 
'$} 
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i(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer 
to each party, 
thin 15 days of the mailing date of the re-
fer review, or within the time period provided 
rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
response with the person designated by statute 
to receive the response. One copy of the re-
shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and 
presiding officer. |),If a statute or the agency's rules require review 
order by the agency or a superior agency, the 
JOT superior agency shall review the order 
a reasonable time or within the time required 
statute or the agency's rules. 
To assist in review, the agency or superior 
may by order or rule permit the parties to file 
or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
i) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to 
parties. 
m (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of 
•toy response, other filings, or oral argument, or 
•Within the time required by statute or applicable 
Irules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a 
•written order on review. r 
p (b) The order on review shall be signed by the" 
fyency head or by a person designated by the 
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
party. 
£(c) The order on review shall contain: U) 
k (i) a designation of the statute or rule per-
Wnitting or requiring review; f 
^ (ii) a statement of the issues reviewed^ 
huK
 (iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues 
^reviewed; { 
1,1
 (iv) conclusions of law as to each of thef 
^issues reviewed; ^ , 
*
>ij
 (v) the reasons for the disposition; ' " 
0
 (vi) whether the decision of the presiding 
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, 
h or modified, and whether all or any portion 
'
K
 of the adjudicative proceeding is to be re* 
manded;
 t (vii) a notice of any right of farther ad-
H*'( ministrative reconsideration or judicial re* 
review available to aggrieved parties; and 
J (viii) the time limits applicable to any ap-
l peal or review. isss 
fcb-l& " Agency review — Reconsideration* 
) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order 
js issued for which review by the agency or by a 
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is un-
available, and if the order would otherwise con-
stitute final agency action, any party may file a 
imtten request for reconsideration with the 
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested. , ,
 } x 
.(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the 
Uing of the request is not a prerequisite for seek-
ng judicial review of the order. ,,i><u v 
The request for reconsideration shall be filed 
the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to 
party by the person making the request u 
(a) The agency head, or a person designated for 
hat purpose, shall issue a written order granting 
tie request or denying the request i 
i(b) If the agency head or the person designated 
w that purpose does not issue an order within 20 
ays after the filing of the request, the request 
ir reconsideration* shall be considered to be de» 
led.
 i , to^ (*<j)m-•>N *i»H. isss 
on 
-b> 
V » 
63-46b~14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad* 
ministrative remedies. 
iv (1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after e*2 
hausting all administrative remedies available, ex-
cept that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
^ ^ exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter 
1
"' or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
™
 s
 required; , . ,
 x > Ur
 * (b) the court may'relieved paAysoekingjuii? 
*
r<w
 cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or 
all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inade-
quate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring ex-
haustion, i
 ; * 
*
r
'(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 days after 
0 |ij the date that the order constituting the final 
„n agency action is issued or is considered to have 
T', been l»ued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). > (b) [The petition shall name the agency and all 
Y0/v other appropriate parties as respondents and 
6r{) shall meet the form requirements specified in 
this chapter.
 <(l >w isss 
6&^6b-15. Judicial review —^Informal adtjudf* 
. , . cative proceedings. 
1(j(l) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
r resulting from informal adjudicative proceed-
ings, except that the juvenile court shall have 
u u jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating 
& j to removal or placement decisions regarding chik 
VJfrdren in state custody. . >$. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal acJjuV 
no dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
-L-T statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
otn of such a venue provision, in the county where 
UW>the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business. 
<* (2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
1® : governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include: } 
;";-i ' (i) the name afid mailing address of the 
P 4iM jjarty seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing addrW 6f the 
9#I0VJ v respondent agency; 
tf*w ,
 ( i i i ) t h e t i t l e a n d d a t e o f ^ final a g e n c v 
.
 <( action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
Yones* ^ ^ copy* summary or, brief description of 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
\
 ( ings that led to the agency action; ,; 
oi Wtfr< (y) A copy ofthe written agency order,from 
lfri the informal proceeding; , V)C ,i, , 
<yV<^(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
-OP. i^i seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
; r « i 8 i t 0 r J u ^ ^ X^viewh^mafilMi iliw «t>tb «u*-** 
Hnetort &J<vii),a*request forr^jrelief^.specifying,^ 
*ni f * t y p e and, extent of relief requested; .. to 
(7) Uk. (viii) a statement otthe reasons whyrtto 
WBiiosj; petitioner is entitled to relief, uu >u^i A 
